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ARTICLES 
ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE UN CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS 
MAX COLLETTt 
This article is a critical analysis of Canadian and international management 
strategies for the Northwest Atlantic straddling fish stock. The article exam-
ines whether the proposed UN amendments to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 Convention) provisions concerning 
straddling fish stocks effectively respond to the fundamental problems faced 
thus far, and whether these proposed changes are likely to be acceptable to 
the international community. The author submits that Canada and other na -
tions should endorse and ratify the proposed amendments to the 1982 
Convention in light of the fact that the amendments introduce substantive 
ecosystem approaches to fishery managem;nt and clarify the role and powers 
of presently existing and future international fishery organizations. 
Cet article analyse critiquement des strategies de gestion des stocks de poisson 
qui chevauchent les zones des 200 milles des pays de !'At/antique du Nord. 
L 'article se demande si les modifications proposees a la Troisieme 
Convention de l'ONU sur le droit de la mer concernant ces stocks de poisson 
repondent ejfectivement aux problemes fondamentaux rencontres jusqu 'ici. 
L 'article se demande par ailleurs si ces modifications seront acceptables a la 
communaute internationale. L 'auteur suggere que le Canada et des autres 
pays devraient approuver et ratifier les modifications proposees parce qu 'elles 
introduisent des strategies de gestion qui repondent aux besoins de l'ecosys-
teme et qui clarifient le role et les pouvoirs des organisations internationaux 
de peche, y compris celles qui existent et celles qui seront etablies a l'avenir. 
t B.A. (British Columbia), LL.B. anticipated 1996 (Dalhousie). 
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The legislation is a national emergency measure pending 
the development of a permanent international solution, 
providing effective controls for high seas fisheries. The 
legislation gives the Government of Canada the legal 
authority to make regulations for the conservation of ... 
"straddling" stocks. 1 
The ancient concept of freedom of the seas can and must 
be transformed into a modern and progressive ideal of 
rational international cooperation to ensure that irre-
versible ecological harm to the oceans does not become 
our contribution to our common future. 2 
The history of Canadian and international fisheries management in 
the Northwest Atlantic reveals the inadequacy of the current fish-
eries regime as provided for in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. 3 
Canada has advocated management of Atlantic high seas and 
straddling stock4 fisheries in accordance with the 1982 Convention. 
Beyond its 200-mile Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ), Canada supports 
and participates in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(N AFO), an international fisheries organization (IFO) that 
cooperatively manages high seas fish resources. NAFo's conservation 
and management measures reflect customary legal regimes for 
fisheries management, and to date have been deficient in managing 
and conserving straddling fish stocks. Consequently, Atlantic fish 
stocks have severely suffered from overfishing, forcing the 
Canadian government to apply drastic domestic and international 
measures. Two significant government actions include a 
1 Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-20, "An Act to Amend the 
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 1994" Qune 1994). 
2 J. Carr & M. Gianni, "High Seas Fisheries, Large-Scale Drift Nets, and the 
Law of the Sea" in J.M. Van Dyke, D. Zelke & G. Hewison, eds., Freedom of the 
Seas in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) [hereinafter 
Freedom] 272 at 287. 
3 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 
[hereinafter 1982 Convention]. 
4 Straddling fish stocks are those stocks whose natural migration patterns exceed 
the political seaward boundaries established by the exclusive economic zone (EEZJ. 
E. Meltzer, "Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: 
The Non-sustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries" (1994) 25 O.D.I.L. 255 at 
256-57. 
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moratorium on all major cod fisheries inside Canada's EFz5 and 
amendments to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 6 to enable 
control and arrest of foreign fishing vessels in the NAFO regulatory 
area that disregard NAFO conservation measures.7 Currently, 
Canada seeks international recognition for its decision to take 
"emergency legislative measures" with regard to the remaining fish 
stocks. 
There is an urgent need to clarify and strengthen, through in-
ternational cooperation and negotiation, the implementation of the 
1982 Convention provisions on high seas fishery management, and 
in particular, straddling stock management. 8 The international 
5 The moratorium on all of the major cod fisheries inside Canada's EFZ was 
announced on December 20, 1993 in Canada's Atlantic Groundftsh Management 
Plan for 1994. Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-14E, "The 
Fisheries Crisis in the Northwest Atlantic" (May 1994). 
6 An Act to Amend Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, S.C. 1994, c. 14 amending 
R.S. 1985, c. C-33. 
The amendment to the Act enables the Government of Canada to make 
regulations for the conservation of specific straddling stocks by (i) listing the 
straddling stocks to be protected; (ii) establishing the conservation and management 
measures that will apply on the high seas to protect the listed stocks; and (iii) listing 
the classes of foreign vessels to which these measures will apply. The legislation also 
provides for the use of force if necessary to arrest vessels, and for regulations setting 
out the procedures for the responsible use of force. Government of Canada, supra 
note 1. 
7 Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C., c. 413, as am. by SORL94-362. 
This amendment lists the straddling stocks, two classes of vessels (vessels without 
nationality and vessels from listed States) and the conservation measures needed to 
implement the prohibition of any person on a foreign vessel from fishing for any 
listed straddling stocks contrary to listed conservation measures. Vessels from the 
listed States are vessels operating under "flags of convenience" that fish or have 
recently fished in the NAFO Regulatory Area in disregard of NAFO conservation 
measures. 
8 The straddling stock problem is a global problem: Canada is just one of an 
estimated 15 coastal states facing straddling stock problems because of unregulated 
high seas fishing. Other stocks needing management include pollock in the "Donut 
Hole" of the Bering Sea and the "Peanut Hole" of the Sea of Okhotsk; orange 
roughy on the Challenger Plateau in the high seas off the coast of New Zealand; 
hake, southern blue whiting and squid off Argentina's Patagonian Shelf; jack 
mackerel off the coast of Chile and Peru; cod in the Barents Sea "Loop Hole" off 
the coast of Norway; yellowfin and skipjack runa which Mexico views as a 
straddling stock problem; and in the South Pacific Ocean, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction, highly migratory stocks of tuna, dolphin, and shark. 
Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-18 "Global Overview of 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks" Qune 1994); Oceans Institute of 
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community is seeking to address problems associated with high seas 
fisheries in several conferences,9 including the UN Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. 10 
This paper will examine the straddling stock management issue 
and the current proposals to resolve the problem in three parts. 
First, the paper will summarize problems experienced by NAFO in 
its implementation of management regimes in accord with the 
1982 Convention. Second, the paper will examine whether the most 
recent draft agreement11 for the Conference adequately and ex-
tensively addresses numerous criticisms of the 1982 Convention, as 
well as unresolved disputes between coastal states and distant water 
fishing states (DWFSs). Third, the paper will examine whether the 
draft agreement will likely be endorsed by the international com-
munity. Finally, this paper will assess whether Canada should ac-
cept the draft agreement and ratify the 1982 Convention. I submit 
that Canada's long-term interest in the development of effective 
and internationally acceptable management measures for straddling 
stocks necessitates that Canada adopt the Agreement's advocacy of 
IFO-based management regimes. The Canadian government should 
seek to resolve the straddling stock management problem by sup-
Canada, Managing Fishery Resources Beyond 200 Miles: Canada s Options to Protect 
Northwest Atlantic Straddling Stocks (Halifax: Fisheries Council of Canada, 1990) 
at 11-13. 
9 Two other conferences and one Agreement have been initiated to address the 
high seas fishery crisis: the "International Conference on Responsible Fishing," held 
May 1992 in Cancun; the "FAO Technical Consultations on High Seas Fishing," 
held September 1992 in Rome; and the "United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization Compliance Agreement" of November 1993. The latter agreement 
requires parties to it to control their vessels to prevent any activity that undermines 
conservation measures established by IFOs. The Canadian Government considers the 
latter agreement to be a major breakthrough in providing international 
recognition that all states must comply with IFO measures. Government of Canada, 
Press Release B-HQ-94-15E "Conservation of Fish Stocks on the High Seas-The 
Evolving International Legal Framework" (May 1994); Meltzer, supra note 4 at 
324. 
1° Convened through UNGA Res. 47/192, 22 December 1992, pursuant to the 
directive in Par. 17.50, Chapter 17, Agenda 21 [hereinafter the Conference]. 
11 Chairman Sarya Nandan's "Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks" (23 August 1994) [hereinafter the 
Agreement]. 
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porting international cooperative regimes rather than by extending 
unilaterally the jurisdictional authority of coastal states. 
I. THE 1982 CONVENTION FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT REGIME 
The 1982 Convention hoped to establish effective fishery manage-
ment regimes by enclosing fisheries within two clearly demarcated 
ocean areas: 200 nautical mile coastal state exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ) and the high seas. Theoretically, the EEZ provides 
globally uniform jurisdictions in which coastal states hold sovereign 
exploitive rights and concurrent conservation obligations. 12 
Although the concept is a politically-defined maritime bound-
ary, early advocates of the EEZ concept believed enclosure of the 
oceans encouraged a more rational management of resources since 
the vast majority of living and non-living resources presently ex-
ploitable are situated within 200 miles of coastline. 13 The concept 
was popular to both developed and developing nations, 14 and states 
12 Article 56 gives a coastal state sovereign rights within its EEZ for the purposes 
of exploring and exploiting, and conserving and managing living resources of the 
seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters. Under Article 61, the coastal state is given 
management and enforcement responsibilities, rights, and interests over the living 
resources in the EEZ. The coastal state's rights within this region are quite extensive, 
including the regulation and control of fisheries and other resources, the right to 
make and enforce legislation over the economic exploitation of resources of the 
zone, and protect it against pollution and other hazards 
l3 Over 94% of the world fish catch, virtually all oil and gas deposits presently 
exploitable, and 80% of marine scientific research is conducted within the region. 
See M. Dhamani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 22. 
14 The concept was widely popular; developing coastal states advocated the 
concept as a means to greater control over resources (either through direct fishing 
by their nationals, or through controlling foreign fishing and obtaining some 
revenue through licence fees or contractual access to fishing technology). Moreover, 
in the words of the originator of the concept, the goal of an EEZ was to provide a 
"defensive mechanism to safeguard Africa's and developing countries' [and coastal 
state] interests in an increasingly hostile and acquisitive marine environment." F. 
Njenga, "Historical Background of the Evolution of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Contribution of Africa" in G. Pontecorvo, ed., The New Order of the 
Oceans: The Advent of a Managed Environment (New York: Columbia University, 
1986) 125 at 134. 
The concept was also attractive to economically developed states who sought 
greater access to fisheries and were skeptical of IFO abilities to effectively regulate 
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quickly declared EEZS and EFZs. Accordingly, the concept became 
part of customary international law prior to the conclusion of the 
1982 Convention. 15 
With regard to high seas management, Article 118 of the 1982 
Convention mandates the multilateral creation of IFOs to coopera-
tively manage and conserve high seas resources. This provision, in 
conjunction with several other "obligation" provisions, 16 theoreti-
cally limits DWFS access to high seas resources.17 
fishing. Maritime powers and DWFSs were also encouraged by the establishment of 
clearly defined and uniform territorial jurisdictions which, it was hoped, would 
eliminate the jurisdictional "creep" threat to the navigational freedoms of maritime 
states. See R. R. Churchill & A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: 
Manchester University, 1988) at 231; T. McDorman, "Will Canada Ratify the Law 
of the Sea Convention?" (1988) 25 San Diego L. Rev. 535 at 547; F. Vicuna, The 
Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 238. 
l5 By 1974, 74 States had claimed an EEZ and 15 States an EFZ, plus, by 1985, the 
International Court ofJustice stated that it is "incontestable that ... the institution 
of the exclusive economic zone ... is shown by the practice of States to have become 
a part of customary law." Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 
[1985] I.C.J. Rep. 13 at para. 34 as cited in Vicuna, supra note 14 at 238. 
16 Article 87 states that "The high seas are open to all States" and this freedom 
includes the "freedom of fishing." However, this freedom is subject to being 
exercised by all states "with due regard for the interests of other States." Article 116 
also makes the right to fish subject to treaty obligations and the "the rights and 
duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in Article 63, 
paragraph 2, and Articles 64 to 67" [articles concerning inter-zonal species]. Article 
117 explicitly provides that all states have a duty to take, or to cooperate with other 
states in taking appropriate enforcement measures for their respective nationals as is 
necessary for the conservation of the fishery resources. 
17 Traditionally, customary international law since the 18th century considered 
fish in the high seas to be "free," both res nullius and res communis on the basis that 
the waters were not susceptible to effective occupation, that the resources were 
inexhaustible, and that a specific use of the oceans did not impair other uses. A. W. 
Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional Fisheries 
Organizations (London: Fishing News, 1973) at 16. 
By the mid-20th century such notions were both antiquated and politically 
outdated. They were antiquated in the sense that the development of technology 
resulted in greatly expanded resource-harvesting techniques in various fishery and 
resource industries. They were politically outdated in the sense that the freedom of 
the seas notion was developed in support of colonial desires for the seas to be 
considered international highways for efficient communication and commerce. 
However, this view of the high seas benefited only those nations who could access 
high seas resources. This select group did not include many of the newly indepedent 
developing States. Njenga, supra note 14 at 127, 134. 
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The 1982 Convention recognizes that the 200-mile regime does 
not satisfactorily address the management of several inter-zonal 
species that migrate seasonally or during their life-cycles. 
Accordingly, Article 63.2 mandates the establishment of IFOs to 
reduce ambiguities concerning who manages fish stocks that strad-
dle both an EEZ and the high seas. Article 63.2 directs both coastal 
and high seas states "fishing for such stocks to agree directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree 
upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in 
the adjacent area." 
II. NAFO: A MODEL FISHERY BODY UNDER THE 
1982 CONVENTION 
NAFO was seen by its members 18 and the international community 
as an early effort to implement the spirit of cooperation called for 
in Articles 63(2) and 118 of the 1982 Convention. 19 NAFO was es-
tablished as a consequence of the extension of coastal jurisdiction 
by Canada and the United States in 1977. Its mandate is to 
contribute through consultation and cooperation to the 
optimum utilization, rational management and conserva-
tion of the fishery resources of the Convention Area. 
NAFO promotes contemporary ideas for international 
collaboration in the high seas based on the scientific re-
search fundamentals. 20 
NAFO manages an area called the Regulatory Area, which is that 
part of the Convention Area which lies beyond the areas in which 
coastal states exercise fisheries jurisdiction.21 
18 NAFO currently has 15 contracting parties: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Denmark 
(with respect to the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Estonia, the European Union 
(EU), Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and the 
Russian Federation. Government of Canada, supra note 5. 
19 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries [hereinafter NAFO Convention], NAFO Handbook (Dartmouth: The 
Headquarters of NAFO, 1994) at preamble; B. Applebaum, "The Straddling Stocks 
Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, and Options for 
Coastal State Action" (paper prepared for the 23rd Annual Conference of the Law 
of the Sea Institute, 12-15 June 1987, Noordwijk aan Zee, The Netherlands) at 
3, 14; Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 25. 
2o NAFO Convention, ibid. at introduction. 
21 Ibid. at Article 1.2. 
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Six of the ten identified fish stocks in the NAFO Regulatory 
Area are defined as "straddling stocks" as their biomass "straddle" 
the Canadian 200-mile EFZ limit.22 NAFo's management structure 
provides a forum for cooperation among contracting parties with 
regard to the study, appraisal and exchange of scientific informa-
tion and views relating to the fisheries of the Convention Area.23 
Furthermore, on the basis of advice from scientists who represent 
member states, NAFO sets total allowable catch (TAC) limits, estab-
lishes other conservation measures, and allocates quotas to NAFO 
contracting parties for the listed managed stocks.24 
III. PROBLEMS FACED BY NAFO IN 
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING STOCKS 
Currently, the Northwest Atlantic straddling fish stocks are in a 
precarious state. The NAFO Scientific Council has reported that the 
southern Grand Banks cod stock is at the lowest level recorded, and 
total allowable catches of groundfish across the Canadian EFZ have 
declined 75% since 1988.25 Consequently, in 1992 the Canadian 
government declared a moratorium on the fishing of northern cod, 
Atlantic Canada's most important commercial fish stock. In 1993 
all major cod fisheries within Canada's EFZ were closed and quotas 
for most other groundfish species were sharply restricted. Since 
1993, NAFO has also imposed moratoria on certain stocks in its 
Regulatory Area in order to be consistent with Canada's conserva-
tion decisions. 
There are a number of factors26 causing the present decline. 
However, it is generally agreed that overfishing and irresponsible 
fishing by the Canadian offshore trawler fleet and the foreign fish-
ery outside the 200 miles limit have been critical destructive fac-
tors.27 
22 Applebaum, supra note 19 at 2; Meltzer, supra note 4 at 297. 
23 Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 27. 
24 Ibid. at 17-18; Government of Canada, supra note 5. 
25 Government of Canada, supra note 5. 
26 Other causes include human-induced distortions in predator/prey 
relationships and environmental factors (decreasing water temperatures, oceanic 
salinity changes). Meltzer, supra note 4 at 297. 
27 Ibid. at 297; Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at preface. 
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT 9 
From a Canadian perspective, the critical problem with NAFo's 
present management structure is its inability to regulate and enforce 
the TACs and quotas allocated to its member states, as well as to 
regulate non-member fishing states. This is particularly important 
to Canada since important stocks of cod, flounder and redfish have 
been over-exploited outside of Canada's Grand Banks, on what is 
known as the Nose and Tail. 
NAFo's problems can be summarized as follows: (i) the suscep-
tibility of conservation strategies to domestic pressures of member 
parties; (ii) the ability of members to object to assigned TACs which 
permits unilateral setting of quotas; and (iii) the inability of NAFO 
members to effectively impose conservation measures on member 
and non-member fishing vessels fishing in the Regulatory Area. 
1. Ineffective Conservation Strategies: 
Article II of the NAFO Convention establishes that parties are to co-
operatively manage resources by following standards set by the 
Scientific Council and managed by the Fisheries Commission. In 
establishing fish quotas, Article 11 subparagraphs 2 and 3 state that 
the Fisheries Commission should "achieve the optimum utilization 
of the fishery resources of the Regulatory Area" as qualified by the 
need for consistency between coastal state and Regulatory Area 
quotas. However, critics have noted that term "optimum utiliza-
tion" does not provide assistance for states in determining allowable 
catches. 28 Consequently, the potential for dispute as to the appro-
priate measurement allows states to justify a variety of conservation 
measures, including measures to satisfy short-term economic inter-
ests. 29 The conflict between the European Union CEU) and NAFO 
demonstrates that the lack of common agreement as to proper 
management reference points severely hinders NAFO objectives. 
Between 1979 and 1985, NAFO parties abided by TACs set by 
NAFO that were determined in accord with what Applebaum calls 
the "two pillars" of the conservation structure: a "conservative" con-
servation in the setting of TACs in the form of "F.O.l,"30 and the 
28 Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 32. 
29 Ibid. at 33; FAO Fisheries Department., FAO Technical Consultation on High 
Seas Fishing FIPL/484 (Suppl.) (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, 1992) at 38 [hereinafter FAO]. 
30 F.0.1 is a means to set TACS at a level below the "maximum sustainable yield" 
(MSYl in order to provide a cautionary barrier that minimizes dangers inherent in 
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maintenance of traditional proportionate shares for the member 
countries.31 
In 1985, the EU changed its position, claiming that NAFO refer-
ence points were (i) unduly restrictive, (which resulted in the loss of 
previous catches), and (ii) failed to recognize the Communities' so-
cio-economic problems.32 The EU subsequently refused to be bound 
by NAFO conservation reference points, and established its own 
Maximum Sustainable Yield quotas on an Fmax basis. These levels 
were consistently set above both NAFO quotas33 and the EU member 
states' historical stock share. 
The domestic problems referred to by the EU as the motivating 
force for disputing NAFO stock quotas included the scheduled en-
trance of Spain and Portugal into the EU. The entrance of these two 
states considerably expanded the total number of EU fishermen and 
led to a 75% increase in fishing capacity, a 45% rise in production 
for human consumption, and a 43% increase in fish consumption in 
the enlarged Community.34 The inclusion of Spain and Portugal 
also implied that the EU allocation would be divided amongst more 
states, lessening proportional harvests of member states.35 
2. NAFO Objection Procedures 
The ability of the EU to accommodate its domestic pressures by 
objecting to NAFo's management reference points and using an al-
ternative, higher yielding measurement, was sanctioned by NAFO 
Convention objection procedures. Article XII of the N AF o 
Convention permits any contracting party to object to and not 
the possibility of errors in scientific assessments of stocks and provide consistency in 
the annual catches. 
31 Supra note 19 at 3. 
32 Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 39. 
33 The EUs 1989 quota for the NAFO fishery was set at 160,000 tons, 12 times 
higher than the 13,000 tons allocated by NAFO. Total 1990 EU catches from NAFO 
managed stocks were estimated to be five times higher than the quotas "officially" 
allocated, and almost three times the Eu's autonomous quotas. Meltzer, supra note 4 
at 299. 
34 Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 39. 
35 Evelyn Meltzer has also noted that another change in internal EU problems led 
to further increases in unilateral quotas in 1990; the EU increase in 1990 coincided 
with Namibia's extension of jurisdiction which displaced many Spanish and 
Portuguese vessels that fished those waters. These same vessels transferred there 
efforts to the Canadian Grand Banks, either under EU flags or reflagged as non-
contracting parties to the NAFO area. See supra note 4 at 299. 
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comply with Council proposals and "binding" measures.36 From 
1986 onwards, the EU repeatedly used the objection procedure so as 
to not comply with most of the management measures adopted 
annually by the NAFO Fisheries Commission. 
3. Enforcement Measures 
Article XVII authorizes flag states to impose sanctions for violations 
"as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of the 
Convention and to implement any measures which become bind-
ing .... " The imposition of sanctions is ineffective if the flag state, 
such as the EU, objects to the binding measure. 
Moreover, these enforcement measures permit many non-NAFO-
member fishing state vessels as well as member state vessels flying 
"flags of convenience" to harvest fish stocks in the NAFO Area with 
impunity and without regard to NAFO conservation measures.37 
Thus, the NAFO Convention uses vague terms to guide the es-
tablishment of TACs, permits states to object to its conservation 
measures, and relies on flag state enforcement. This has permitted, 
and even legitimized, overfishing, which makes NAFO an ineffective 
management regime. 
IV. DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THE 
1982 CONVENTION 
NAFo's inability to resolve internal member disputes and to enforce 
coastal management regimes highlight IFO problems under the 
1982 Convention provisions. The following is a brief analysis of the 
inadequacies of the 1982 Convention. 
First, the EEZ/high seas demarcation of jurisdictions does not 
address what Arvid Pardo calls the "inclusive" nature of fish.3 8 
36 NAFO Convention, supra note 19 at 20. 
37 These nations include: the United States, Mexico, Chile, Panama, Mauritania, 
Venezuela, the Cayman Islands and South Korea. Ibid. at 299; Oceans Institute, 
supra note 8 at 30. 
38 A. Pardo suggests that the 1982 Convention provisions create "100 different 
sovereignties of management" that provide well for exclusive uses of the sea but do 
not adequately govern inclusive uses of the sea, including management of migratory 
stocks." To Pardo, these provisions guarantee a permissive freedom, a negative 
freedom that encourages the use of the sea without responsibility for its 
consequences. In contrast, the author suggests that what is needed is a positive 
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Although a great majority of fishery activity does occur within the 
EEZ limits, the 1982 Convention conveys the impression that most 
fish stocks confine themselves to the EEZ of a single coastal state. 
This impression is simplistic and inadequate as the nature of fish is 
to migrate, often well beyond the 200-mile jurisdiction of the 
coastal state.39 Since coastal state conservation and management 
regimes are enforceable only on fishing activities within the 200-
mile jurisdiction, the functional effectiveness of straddling stock 
conservation measures is severely impaired. As an example, roughly 
10% of the Grand Banks extend beyond Canada's EFZ, and many 
stocks straddle Canada's EFZ waters into two geographical areas re-
ferred to as the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks. Under the 1982 
Convention EEZ regime, Canada cannot enforce its conservation 
measures on these stocks or those fishermen harvesting these stocks 
beyond its EFZ. 
Second, the 1982 Convention relies on states to establish IFOs 
for high seas management. Based on the fact that most IFOs are re-
active institutions, in the sense of being organized in order to re-
spond to a management crisis, the provisions have the effect of 
severely compromising the fishery resource needing management.4° 
freedom, permitting use of the seas with positive duties to manage what is to be 
utilized. See A. Pardo, "Perspectives on Ocean Governance" in Freedom, supra note 
2 at 39. 
39 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 14 at 234; Dhamani, supra note 13 at 156. 
4° Fisheries have historically been allowed to develop relatively unmonitored 
until the resource industry reaches a crisis stage, demonstrated by overcapitalization, 
excess capaciry, intensive competition, decline in catches, and/or a negative and 
severe impact on non-target species. J. Carr & M. Gianni "High Seas Fisheries, 
Large-Scale Drift Nets, and the Law of the Sea" in Freedom, supra note 2, 272 at 
287. 
Moreover, IFOs have had limited success once established; few IFOs have access to 
independent research staffs, and hence are reliant on national scientists who disagree 
on the appropriate scientific data to be used. Also, as NAFO demonstrates, IFOs are 
rarely given the competence to regulate the fisheries directly, and hence have had 
their recommendations defied and enforcement procedures negated by flag state 
non-cooperation. W. Burke "Unregulated High Seas Fishing and Ocean 
Governance" in Freedom supra note 2, 235 at 244. 
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V. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO 1982 
CONVENTION 
There is considerable discussion concerning changes needed to the 
1982 Convention in order effectively to address the straddling 
stock management problem. The discussion has focussed on three 
problem areas: (i) a need for an ecosystem framework and clarifica-
tion of IFO management guidelines; (ii) the need for a precise defi-
nition of competencies between coastal states and DWFSs within the 
management structure of an IFO; (iii) elaboration and clarification 
of the respective legal rights and obligations of coastal states, 
DWFSs, and IFO managerial bodies. 
1. Clear Guidelines Mandating Ecosystem Management Regimes 
IFOs need guidelines for adopting conservation measures with re-
spect to high seas fisheries. 41 As discussed earlier, the uncertainty as 
to what constitutes "optimum management" permits states to 
dispute what constitutes "scientific data" and what is an 
"unreasonable catch." In turn, this uncertainty permits policy-mak-
ers to appease domestic fishery interests by setting high TACs. New 
reference points need to be developed and agreed to which establish 
acceptable and biologically safe impact levels. These reference 
points must not only be based on a single-species approach but also 
be part of a strategy that includes multi-species and ecosystem real-
ities.42 
Article 119 of the 1982 Convention recognizes that fishery 
management decisions must be made on uncertain and limited in-
formation when it stipulates that states "shall take measures which 
are designed on the best scientific evidence available." This was de-
signed so that states would not continue to fish in an unregulated 
fashion with the pretext of incomplete information. 
4l Oceans Institute, supra note 8 at 33 
42 The management reference points must be set with regard to numerous 
factors, such as the need for a selective catch via controls on various gear used in 
different areas in different seasons so as to account and allow for the reproductive 
requirements of stocks, both target and non-target. The reference points should 
permit reproduction and regeneration of stocks. Similar ideas must be applied to 
ensure reduced capture of non-target stocks, endangered species, species in 
"protected" stages such as times of spawning or juvenile stages. FAO, supra note 29 at 
53. 
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This provision is insufficient: states have taken advantage of the 
opportunity to disagree on what is deemed "evidence" and "best." 
Hence, changes and elaborations to the 1982 Convention must 
clarify what approach is to be taken in regard to these uncertainties, 
and whether a precautionary approach should be taken when there is a 
lack of definitive information. 
2. Precise Definition of Competencies Between Coastal States 
and DWFSs, Under the Umbrella of an IFO 
IFOs are a meeting point for the divergent interests of coastal states 
and DWFSS. In order for states successfully to establish IFOs to man-
age competing interests, a globally applicable document such as the 
1982 Convention should provide constructive guidelines on the es-
tablishment of management procedures, allocation factors, and en-
forcement mechanisms. 
The FAO has examined the requirements necessary for a success-
ful IFO. Key factors that should be included in a UN Convention 
providing guidelines for states to establish an effective IFO include 
provisions mandating the need for: 
0 a clearly defined and mutually accepted purpose for 
the IFO. 
0 mechanisms for the timely, accurate and complete 
supply of scientific data by members. 
" neutral and impartial IFO Councils. 
0 agreement by parties to immediately adopt effort 
levels determined by IFO Councils. 
0 clarification of flag State responsibility. 
0 clearly defined and operable dispute resolution proce-
dures.43 
3. Clarification of Legal Rights and Obligations 
The combination of flag state powers and the lack of clarity in 
Article 63(2) of the 1982 Convention demonstrate that future elab-
oration on the straddling stock problem must address who has au-
thority to impose conservation measures, on whom, and to what 
degree. Presently, authors who have sought to find a legal justifica-
tion to permit coastal state and IFO enforcement of conservation 
measures on foreign vessels fishing a managed stock must make 
43 FAO, supra note 29 at 45-51. 
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lengthy and speculative arguments. This reveals the need for a clar-
ification of powers.44 
As an example, Burke and Miles suggest that if it is accepted 
that the 1982 Convention was designed to create single manage-
ment units (EEZS or IFOs), then Article 87.2 ("freedom to fish") can 
and should be qualified by Articles 63.2, 118 (duty to adopt con-
servation measures) and Article 56 (coastal states have sovereign 
rights over the resources within their EEZ). The authors allege that 
this interpretation gives authority for coastal states to preserve their 
EEZ sovereign rights by restricting high seas fishing where they can 
show (i) a relationship between the stocks inside and outside the 
EEZ, and (ii) that conservation measures on the high seas are neces-
sary for efficient conservation of the fishery within the EEZ. 45 
VI. THE UN CONFERENCE 
The UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks has a mandate to address the problems 
identified thus far.46 
44 See Applebaum, supra note 19; K. Sullivan, "Conflict in the Management of a 
Northwest Atlantic Transboundary Cod Stock" (1989) 13 Marine Pol'y 118; C. 
Joyner, "Chile's Presential Sea Proposal: Implications for Straddling Stocks and 
the International Law of Fisheries" (1993) 24 O.D.I.L. 99; see especially E. Miles 
& W. Burke, "Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks" 
(1989) 20 O.D.I.L. 343 [hereinafter "Pressures"]; and W. Burke, "Fishing in the 
Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International Law of Fisheries" 
(1989) 16 Ecological L.Q. 285 [hereinafter "Donut"]. 
45 "Donut," ibid. at 302. 
46 Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 states that the Conference will be organized to 
promote effective implementation of 1982 Convention provisions by (i) identifying 
and assessing existing conservation and management problems of such fish stocks, 
and (ii) formulating means of improving cooperation on fisheries which are 
consistent with the Convention provisions. UNCED, Agenda 21: Prog-ramme of Action 
for Sustainable Development (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1993) 
155. See also The Chairman's "A Guide to the Issues Before the Conference 
Prepared by the Chairman" (UN Doc. NCONF. 164/10 (24 June 1993), para. 12) 
as found in Payoyo, infta note 60. 
It should be noted that the UN Conference was not the first international meeting 
in which there were proposals to clarify the ambiguities of the 1982 Convention; 
during UNCLOS III, Canada and other coastal States were dissatisfied with Article 63 
and submitted a compromise proposal that gave a mandate for tribunal-based 
resolution of conservation measures for straddling stocks. The aim was to 
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The Conference has completed three sessions, with a final ses-
sion scheduled in the spring of 1995. Chairman Satya Nandan's 
draft Agreement seeks to resolve contentious issues remaining at the 
end of the second and third sessions. Evelyne Meltzer, who at-
tended the organizational and substantive sessions of the 
Conference as a representative of UN Association in Canada, sum-
marized the outstanding problems after the second session as fol-
lows. A critical issue of debate between coastal states and the DWFSS 
concerns whether the coastal state should be recognized as having a 
special interest in ensuring that measures on the high seas are com-
patible with their adjacent EEZ measures. Many DWFSs argue that 
fish stocks should be managed as a biological unit, and not be di-
vided among political boundaries.47 Many coastal states consider 
this position as an unjustifiable interference with their EEZ sovereign 
rights. Second, there remains concern for the nature of flag state re-
sponsibility over vessels on the high seas. Third, although most 
states agreed that the precautionary principle should be imple-
mented as a management tool, greater definition of the concept is 
needed. Fourth, states disagreed on the implications of the 
Conference; coastal states want a legally binding convention while 
DWFSs want general recommendations for straddling stock man-
agement that are to apply within and beyond the EEZ.48 
encourage consistency between EEZ conservation and the measures to be established 
by the tribunal. This was not adopted. Again, at the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) the Santiago Group of over 40 like-
minded states concerned with the status of high seas living resources introduced a 
document, A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.Il/L.16/Rev.l, that sought to consolidate and 
codify the customary international law regarding management principles for 
fishing on the high seas and introduce conservation, management, and enforcement 
measures. This proposal was excluded from the Agenda 21 text because it was not 
unanimously accepted. However, as a compromise, the UN Conference was 
established. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.114, (13 April 1982); Meltzer, supra 
note 4 at 323. 
47 Ibid at 326. 
48 On a more positive note, the PAO successfully developed an agreement on the 
issue of flagging and reflagging of fishing vessels on the high seas. See "Agreement 
to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas." The Agreement was adopted in 
1993 and will enter force with the 25th instrument of acceptance. Ibid at 326. 
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VII. EVALUATION OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT 
The following analysis examines the Chairperson's Draft 
Agreement. It will critically examine the document by evaluating 
how well it responds to the criticisms noted earlier regarding the 
vagueness of responsibilities found in the 1982 Convention, and the 
disputes remaining at the UN Conference. This will entail an exami-
. nation of the Agreement's provisions in four parts: (i) general prin-
ciples applicable to fishery management regimes; (ii) rights and du-
ties of officials of IFOs, flag states, and all fishing states; (iii) dispute 
settlement procedures; and (iv) resolution of allocation issues. 
1. General Principles 
The preamble to the Agreement states that all parties are to take 
note that cooperation between parties has been lacking, that the 
problems identified in Agenda 21, chapter 17 must be addressed,49 
and that more effective enforcement measures must be adopted for 
the conservation and management of such stocks. 
The Agreement considerably enhances aspects of an ecosystem 
management framework found in the 1982 Convention. In so do-
ing, the Agreement includes and adopts what David VanderZwaag 
calls an "integrated" approach to international cooperation and co-
ordination. An approach is integrated when it harmonizes manage-
ment at regional and global levels by addressing the competing uses 
and effects of resource utilization on the larger ocean ecosystem.so 
Moreover, the Agreement accommodates the growing belief that a 
guideline document such as the Agreement needs to mandate that 
states take a multi-species and regional approach to fishery man-
agement.SI 
49 Problems identified include: inadequate management of stocks, overutilization 
of some resources, problems of unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive 
fleet size, vessels reflagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, 
unreliable databases and a lack of sufficient cooperation between states. See 
preamble to draft Agreement. 
so "The Concept and Principles of Sustainable Development: 'Rio-formulating' 
Common Law Doctrines and Environmental Laws" (1993) 13 Windsor Y.B. Access 
Just. 39 at 44-45. 
SI Several ecological and NGO groups attending the UN Conference are 
enthusiastic about the draft Agreement's extensive assertion of ecosystem principles. 
See "Joint NGO Statement to the Final Plenary of the Third Substantive Session of 
the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks & Highly Migratory Fish Stocks" 
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The Agreement repeats Article 119 ("the best scientific evidence 
available" to establish MSYs as qualified by environmental factors) in 
Article 5(b). However, several related Articles elaborate further on 
what environmental measures states are to consider. Article 2 states, 
"The objective of this Agreement is to ensure the long-term conser-
vation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly mi-
gratory fish stocks." Article 5 describes the ecological framework in 
which states shall give effect to this goal. States shall 
(d) adopt, where necessary, conservation and manage-
ment measures for other species belonging to the same 
ecosystem or dependent on or associated with the target 
species, with a view to maintaining or restoring popula -
tions of such species above levels at which their reproduc-
tion may become seriously threatened; 
(e) promote the development and use of selective, envi-
ronmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and 
techniques in order to minimize pollution, waste, dis-
cards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-tar-
get species . . . and impacts on ecologically related 
species ... ; 
(f) take into account the need for protecting biodiversity; 
[and] 
(g) take measures to eliminate over fishing and excess 
fishing capacity. 52 
Second, the Agreement gives considerable guidance as to what con-
stitutes "over fishing" in its application of the precautionary princi-
ple.53 In so doing, the Agreement satisfactorily responds to con-
siderable criticisms concerning previous applications of the precau-
tionary principle in ocean regimes. 
(26 August 1994); Commentary, "Draft Treary + Political Will = Hope for Global 
Fisheries" (1994) 88 ECO 1. 
52 The Agreement, article 5. 
53 The principle has several definitions and, as will be discussed later, can be 
interpreted to varying degrees of precaution. An acceptable definition includes two 
notions: (i) that environmental control measures should not depend on or wait for 
scientific certainty of cause-effect link; and (ii) the presumption that it is better to 
err in decision-making on the side of caution. See VanderZwaag, supra note 50 at 
46. 
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The PAO notes that the precautionary principle has long been 
advocated even though rarely applied in practice.54 Moreover, when 
the principle is applied, there is often a lack of certainty with 
regard to the required control measures and levels of acceptable risk 
because of absence of certainty in scientific data.55 
Unlike previous applications of the term, the Agreement gives 
substantial guidance to future IFOs and fishing states as to where the 
principle shall be considered and to what degree. The draft 
Agreement applies the precautionary principle as a general principle 
underlying all conservation, management and exploitation measures 
of straddling stocks (Article 6.1). As with Article 119 .1 of the 
1982 Convention, Article 6.2 mandates that the "best scientific 
evidence available" is to be used. However, in order to reduce inter-
state bickering regarding what is permissible evidence, the Article 
continues by saying "States shall be more cautious when information 
is poor. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and 
management measures" (emphasis added). 
The precautionary approach is explicitly to be used to set stock-
specific minimum management standards, which Article 6.3b states 
will take into account the realities of present scientific uncertainties 
relating to the size and productivity of stocks, precautionary refer-
ence points, levels of mortality, and environmental and socio-eco-
nomic conditions. 
Importantly, Article 6.3d and Annex 2 establish guidelines for 
determining precautionary reference points, and the type of im-
mediate action to be taken if they are exceeded. Annex 2 advocates 
strategies that constrain harvesting within safe biological limits, en-
sure limited risk of over-harvesting, and account for situations of 
poor information on specific stocks by establishing provisional ref-
erence points to similar and better-known stocks. 
Hence, in light of these provisions, "overfishing" would include 
fishing above a cautious level when the information described above 
is uncertain or inadequate. International acceptance of these provi-
sions would clarify the "F.0.1" versus "Fmax" debate evident be-
tween NAFO and the EU in favour of NAFO. These provisions will 
hopefully reduce such inter-member disputes for future IFOs. 
54 Supra note 29 at 42. 
55 VanderZwaag, supra note 50 at 49. 
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Annex 2 has come under some criticism, however. Judith Swan, 
an NGO representative at the UN Conference, states that participants 
in the UN Conference inter-session "informal" meetings cannot de-
termine how the principle would be applied in practice as it is 
presently described in Annex 2.56 Though there is still confusion as 
to its application, one should not lose sight of the fact that state 
parties are examining the concept and trying to understand its pro-
posed implementation. These factors bode well for the application 
of the concept generally in fisheries management and specifically in 
the UN Conference. 
Article 6.2 constructively reverses the burden of proof between 
science and decision-making fishery authorities; policy-makers and 
industry officials can no longer argue real or pretended uncertain-
ties in order to avoid difficult decisions. Instead, policy decisions 
must be made on whatever scientific evidence is available or can be 
provisionally referred to in order to set cautionary measures.57 As 
the FAO notes, this practice is essential for effective anticipatory, 
rather than reactive, management. 
It should also be noted that the draft Agreement's interpreta-
tion of the precautionary principle does not threaten the viability of 
the fishing industry because of the absence of certainty in fishery 
data. This is in contrast to the stringent application of the precau-
tionary principle advocated by the United States with regard to the 
driftnet controversy. 
The United States policy statement on Large-Scale Pelagic 
Driftnets58 advocated a new standard in fishing, including an ap-
plication of the precautionary principle that would preclude a par-
ticular fishery from proceeding unless it was shown that it could be 
conducted without unacceptable impacts. Amongst other criti-
cisms, William Burke finds this extreme interpretation of the prin-
ciple and its application to the fishing industry unduly restrictive: 
he believes this type of "precaution" would ensure the termination 
56 J. Swan, Oceans Institute of Canada representative at the UN Conference, in a 
personal interview with the author (8 November, 1994 at Dalhousie Law School, 
Halifax, N.S.). 
57 PAO, supra note 29 at 42. 
58 U.S. Policy Statement: Kokechik v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 
(1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); U.S. Policy Statement on Large-Scale 
Pelagic Driftnets 4 (submitted to the United Nations Office of Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea, July 1990) [hereinafter U.S. Policy Statement] as found in 
Burke, supra note 40. 
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of fishing because "it is generally accepted that we are ignorant 
about the abundance and distribution of target species and by 
catch."59 
Moreover, this obligation is legally incompatible with the 1982 
Convention which only calls for judgments concerning reference 
points to be based on the "best scientific data available." In contrast 
with the Driftnet proposal, the draft Agreement is consistent with 
the 1982 Convention "best scientific data" standard in its applica-
tion and use of the precautionary principle. Hence, it is more likely 
to be acceptable to the international community. 
The draft Agreement attempts to resolve the outstanding dis-
pute with regard to the compatibility of conservation and manage-
ment measures between coastal states and IF Os. Article 7 .1 states, 
"Conservation and management measures taken on the high seas 
and those taken in areas under national jurisdiction shall be compat-
ible in order to ensure conservation and management of the stocks 
overall." Several provisions indicate that the draft Agreement 
largely recognizes the coastal states' contention that in determining 
conservation measures for straddling stocks the coastal state should 
have a superior position. Article 3 recognizes the sovereign nature of 
EEZ rights when it states that the Agreement applies to stocks be-
yond the areas under national jurisdiction. Article 7 .1 reaffirms that 
the Agreement does not prejudice states' sovereign rights. 
Moreover, Article 7.2a states that in determining compatible con-
servation measures, coastal states and DWFSs shall "ensure that mea-
sures established in respect of the high seas do not undermine the 
effectiveness of those established in respect of the same stock(s) by 
coastal states in areas under national jurisdiction." This article rec-
ognizes the claim of coastal states that they have a special interest in 
straddling stocks when the stock resides within EEZ limits for a 
considerable period of its life cycle. The article also implies coastal 
state superiority in the formulation of management measures if the 
coastal state has pre-established measures, since the measures estab-
lished for the high seas must not undermine the effectiveness of the 
coastal state measures. Assuming that enclosure principles lead to 
59 W. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and 
Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 148; see Burke, supra note 40 at 258. 
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more effective management measures, these provisions enhance the 
probability of better management. Go 
On the other hand, it is submitted that several provisions of the 
Agreement also recognize the DWFss' claim that management mea-
sures should take into account the biological unity of specific 
stocks. Where the stock in issue has a biological life cycle that is 
rarely within the EEZ area, Article 7.2b can be interpreted to imply 
that the stock's biological data should have equal weight when de-
termining proper conservation measures. Article 7.2b states that all 
parties shall 
take into account the biological unity and other charac-
teristics of the stock(s) and the relationship between the 
distribution of the stock(s), the fisheries and the geo-
graphical particularities of the region, including the ex-
tent to which the stock(s) occur and are fished in areas 
under national jurisdiction. 
Hence, in situations where the stock in issue resides mostly on the 
high seas, DWFSs could argue that Article 7.2a (preference to the 
coastal state) should not be enforced. Instead, conservation mea-
sures for such stocks should reflect their natural migratory patterns. 
Article 7.2c recognizes another DWFS concern-that the depen-
dence of DWFSs on fish stocks must be accounted for when deter-
mining management measures. Article 7.2c recognizes that depen-
dencies are not limited to coastal state communities, but also in-
clude communities in DWFSS (such as the Basque in Spain) which 
have significant proportions of their population working in tradi-
60 This presumption is under criticism, however, both in practice and as a 
theoretical basis for establishing management measures. In practice, the history of 
Canada's East Coast fishery after Canada's declaration of a 200 mile EFZ does little 
to demonstrate that enclosure necessarily leads to a more rational management of 
resources. After the 1977 announcement of Canada's EFZ, fishermen immediately 
reaped the benefits of access to new resources. This led to an over stimulation of the 
industry and over capacity on the East Coast. This has added, in part, to the present 
crisis. 
Theoretically, the presumption is under attack by advocates of the "common 
heritage of mankind" theory, such as Peter Payoyo, who believe that reliance on a 
theoretical basis that "divides the spoils" on the basis of exclusive property rights, is 
bound to lead to incessant disagreement and limited success in effective 
management of species. See above for further discussion of this argument, and P. 
Payoyo "Fishing For the Common Heritage in Straddling and Highly-Migratory 
Fish Stocks: A Case Study" (Oceans Institute, 1994) [unpublished]. 
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tional high seas fishery operations. Article 7 .2 states that. in deter-
mining compatible conservation and management measures, both 
coastal states and states fishing on the high seas shall "take into ac-
count the respective dependence of the coastal State(s) and the 
State(s) fishing on the high seas on the stock(s) concerned." Again, 
although the coastal state's sovereign rights within its EEZ are not 
infringed by this rule, there is an indirect qualification on the con-
servation measures to be established within the EEZ concerning 
straddling stocks. The coastal state, in establishing conservation 
measures for specified stocks, must take into account the interests 
of DWFSS who harvest the same stock on the high seas. 
Such limited infringements on EEZ sovereign rights may be per-
ceived as qualifying coastal state sovereign EEZ management rights, 
which will not be popular amongst many states. However, coastal 
states should recognize that their long-term conservation goals are 
better achieved through consistent and compatible measures on 
straddling stocks, even if internal EEZ management rights might 
potentially be restricted by high seas interests concerning the same 
straddling stocks. 
2. Rights and Duties of Relevant Authority Levels 
i. IFOs 
Part III of the Agreement provides guidelines for the establishment 
of IFOs and a clarification of IFO enforcement powers. These charac-
teristics are notably absent in Article 118 in the 1982 Convention. 
Article 118 provides that 
States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation 
and management of living resources in the high seas ... 
[and] as appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional 
or regional fisheries organizations to this end. 
In contrast, the Agreement's Part III provisions explicitly strengthen 
the role of IFOs; Article 8.3 states that states shall give effect to their 
duty to cooperate in relation to straddling stock management by 
participating in all established regional or subregional management 
organization measures. Moreover, subparagraph 4 states that only 
those states that participate in or abide by the measures of the rele-
vant IFO "shall have access to the fishery." This provision, in con-
junction with the dispute resolution procedures to be analyzed 
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shortly, provide a more effective legal mechanism to address non-
IFO and IFO fishing vessels that do not abide by IFO policies. 
Articles 9-12 elaborate in detail the structure and function of 
future IFOs. These articles also emphasize the need to empower pre-
sent IFOs. IFOs are to be established in conjunction with agreement 
amongst relevant fishing parties on such factors as the stock(s) and 
area to which the measures are to apply, and the mechanisms by 
which the IFO will obtain scientific advice. Moreover, IFOs are to be 
the forum for parties to establish and abide by procedures concern-
ing scientific measures, monitoring, control, surveillance and en-
forcement mechanisms. It should be emphasized that these guide-
lines are to be agreed upon as the IFO is being established, which 
will reduce ambiguity of terms and procedures. This in turn should 
eliminate any delay in members adopting rFo-determined effort 
levels and other conservation measures once the IFO 's reference 
points are established. 
ii. Flag States 
In order to be consistent with the 1982 Convention, the Agreement 
maintains flag state responsibilities over vessels on the high seas. 
However, in contrast to Article 117 of the 1982 Convention, which 
states that it is the duty of flag states to ensure their nationals abide 
by IFO measures, the Agreement provisions are extensively detailed 
in the specific obligations to which a flag state must agree before its 
nationals are permitted to fish in IFO managed regions. Article 17 .1 
states that the flag state must ensure that its vessels comply with 
regional conservation strategies. Reference to Articles 8.4 (limited 
access) and 32 indicate that vessels must comply not only with the 
strategies of IFOs of which they are members, but all established IFO 
measures. Article 32. l clearly states: 
Where a state does not participate in the work carried out 
through a subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or arrangement, that state is not discharged 
from the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and 
management of the relevant stock(s). 
Subparagraph 2 goes further and states that 
[a] state which does not cooperate with ... [an IFO] shall 
not authorize vessels flying its flag to operate in fisheries 
which are subject to conservation and management 
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT 25 
measures established by that organization or arrange-
ment. 
Article 17.2 states that no flag state shall authorize any vessels to 
fish on high seas where it cannot effectively exercise its responsibili-
ties which are detailed extensively in subparagraph 3. As is custom-
ary, enforcement provisions remain with the flag state; Article 18 
requires the flag state to investigate any alleged violations by its na-
tionals, and to expeditiously report back to the state alleging the 
violation on the progress and outcome of the investigation. 
iii. All States 
Part IV constructively expands on Article 94.6 of the 1982 
Convention which provides that a state with clear grounds to be-
lieve that control of foreign vessels is being exercised improperly 
may report this fact to flag state. Article 20 gives foreign states 
greater rights to enforce IFO conservation measures on foreign ves-
sels. Article 20.2 encourages IFOs to establish agreed upon proce-
dures for monitoring, enforcement and surveillance of vessels: 
States shall agree on procedures under which the appro-
priate authorities of one state may board and inspect a 
fishing vessel flying the flag of another state, including 
notification requirements and procedures under which 
one state might arrest and detain a fishing vessel flying 
the flag of another state. 
Subparagraph 3 enables similar boarding and inspection powers to 
be developed by IFOs for vessels without nationality or flying "flags 
of convenience." These provisions considerably enhance the powers 
of foreign state and IFO officers to investigate, report, and even de-
tain foreign vessels allegedly not abiding by the IFO measures. 
Will such limitations on the traditional impunity of vessels on 
the high seas be acceptable to DWFSs and maritime states? To be ac-
ceptable, the enforcement provisions must condone only acts of au-
thority that are explicitly for the enforcement of IFO conservation 
and management goals for certain straddling fish stocks. This pro-
vision should not be used to justify a coastal state's furtherance of 
its domestic goals or interests. This key distinction must be clear. It 
would appear that the draft Agreement provisions have achieved 
this clarity. 
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Presently, Part IV mandates that all states will be subject to 
mutually agreed-upon IFO standards, and that any state with a rea-
sonable ground for suspecting impropriety by another state can act 
to enforce the IFO standards instead of relying on the flag state en-
forcement. If Part IV provisions were expanded so as to authorize 
coastal state actions not explicitly connected to IFO measures, IFOs 
could be viewed by DWFSs as permitting coastal state extensions of 
jurisdictional authority. Such changes would compromise an IFo's 
"neutral" nature as a forum for the resolution of coastal state-DWFS 
disputes. 
As stated, Part IV provisions should be acceptable to the inter-
national community as they condone only IFO-regulated infringe-
ments on flag-state sovereign rights. At present, Article 20.1 limits 
enforcement powers on foreign vessels to powers exercised in ac-
cordance with IFO procedures. The provisions mandate effective en-
forcement but limit the use of the enforcement measures to prob-
lems concerning fishing specific stocks. Hence, the times when this 
power will be legally used will be defined by individual IFOs so that 
the powers reflect the particular characteristics of the straddling 
stocks and IFO region. 
Judith Swan states that Canada will not ratify the Agreement 
until Article 20 includes a recognition that a coastal state can legis-
late emergency functional management measures to conserve 
straddling stocks.61 Canada should not seek recognition for coastal 
states to act unilaterally to enforce conservation measures. Instead, 
such actions should remain within the prerogative of neutral IFO 
managers or member state officials who act in accordance with IFO 
rules, as is endorsed in Article 20. Although Judith Swan is hopeful 
that this amendment will be accepted prior to the fourth session, 
Canada should qualify this demand since it is surely going to be a 
"hard sell" with DWFSS. 
The following is a qualification on Canada's proposal. 62 A 
coastal state should only have to take "emergency" measures when 
the IFO is ineffective in its enforcement role. In order for coastal 
state "emergency enforcement powers" to be acceptable to DWFSs, 
coastal states should accept that such an act would automatically 
trigger a dispute settlement process whereby a straddling stock ar-
bitral tribunal will evaluate the competing claims. The tribunal will 
61 Swan, supra note 56. 
62 This idea was discussed by the author during an interview with Swan, ibid. 
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determine whether the legislation is genuinely aimed at reasonable 
conservation measures or whether the legislation is truly a coastal 
state attempt to promote its own interests in high seas fisheries. 
This proposal has several advantages. First, it still gives the 
coastal state the legal offensive, the right to act to prevent degrada-
tion of a resource or habitat when the IFO has not succeeded. This is 
in accord with an anticipatory management philosophy. Second, 
the proposal allows for DWFSs to have their arguments heard in or-
der to determine the legitimacy of the legislation. Third, the use of 
the same tribunal body will lead to a greater degree of expertise, 
and hopefully, consistency in the tribunal's decision-making. 
Eventually, this could establish a body of precedent concerning 
"straddling stock issues,'' providing states with greater certainty as 
to the legality of their actions. This ultimately could lessen inter-
state disputes. 
3. Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes 
Part VIII of the Agreement is ancillary to the procedures for the 
settlement of disputes provided for in Part XV of the 1982 
Convention. Since these provisions relate to institutional aspects of 
the law of the sea they have not been tested through implementa-
tion. Hence, it is difficult to assess the further contribution made 
by the Agreement's provisions. 
A preliminary overview of the two mechanisms reveals several 
similarities. Both provisions state that parties have an obligation to 
settle and encourage parties to use conciliation proceedings or to es-
tablish mutually agreed upon ad hoc expert panels to resolve the 
disputed matter expeditiously. Article 28(3) of the Agreement 
dearly states that all parties to a dispute, regardless of whether they 
are members of IFOs, are subject to the 1982 Convention provisions 
when negotiations fail. For those states that are members of or par-
ticipants in an IFO, Article 29 mandates IFO members to establish, 
strengthen or adapt to the new dispensation internal dispute settle-
ment procedures. If acted on, such arrangements will assure a more 
timely and effective resolution of disputes. 
The Agreement does propose several novel additions to the dis-
pute resolution process. First, several provisions propose judicial 
procedures specifically created for straddling stock issues. The 
Agreement sets out a detailed arbitration procedure, found in 
Annex III, which is a model for interested states to use when estab-
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lishing their own settlement mechanisms. Annex III also is the basis 
for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal for resolving straddling 
and highly migratory stock conflicts. Article 30.2 provides the tri-
bunal with jurisdiction to prescribe provisional measures to prevent 
damage to the stock(s) in question or to preserve the respective 
rights of the parties to the dispute. 
The proposed arbitral tribunal has several improvements on the 
International Court of Justice (!CJ). Whereas Churchill and Lowe63 
note that the ICJ has the disadvantage that the parties are not 
wholly free to determine the composition of the Court, 64 the pro-
posed arbitral tribunal procedures mandate that of the three tri-
bunal members, one will be appointed within a limited time by 
each party to the dispute, and the third (the President) will be mu-
tually agreed upon. 65 
It is hoped that these changes will result in greater party accep-
tance of the dispute resolution process. Hitherto, the dispute reso-
lution process has not been popular among states. Moreover, as the 
tribunal is specialized in regard to straddling stock issues, the tri-
bunal decisions will lead to greater uniformity in decision-making 
on straddling stock issues throughout the world. 
A second feature of the arbitral tribunal is that though its provi-
sional measures may be modified or revoked with a change of the 
circumstances justifying them, this can only be done after the par-
ties have been given an opportunity to be heard. Again, this feature 
prevents unilateral actions by states in taking advantage of the un-
certainty of facts concerning fishery management. For example, a 
state might otherwise claim that, according to its scientific evi-
dence, the circumstances justifying the measures have changed so 
that the measures are no longer needed, and the state might order a 
resumption of its prohibited activities. 
The provisions also emphasize the need for timely and expedi-
tious decision-making procedures, not only within the IFO (see 
Articles 26, 29), but also in situations where IFO procedures fail, or 
63 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 14 at 333. 
64 It should be noted that a party to a dispure at the ICJ does have some choice of 
the judiciary; a party has the right to appoint a judge of its choosing if there is no 
judge of its nationality on the bench. Ibid. at 333. 
65 Article 3 of Annex 3 states provides that if the President has not been 
designated within twenty-one days, the President of the International Tribunal of 
the LOS shall appoint the President of the arbitral tribunal. 
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are non-existent, and parties must resort to the use of provisional or 
Part XV measures (see Articles 30.6). The time limitations 
increase the likelihood that disputes will be resolved. 
4. Resolution of Allocation Issues 
In contrast to the improvements noted above, the Agreement does 
not substantively address allocation issues. In the present draft, 
Article 1 Ob states that allocation issues will be addressed through 
regional fishery bodies. Article 16, which addresses a critical issue 
related to allocation, new participants, similarly does no more than 
list a number of interested parties that states shall take into account 
when determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for 
new members of IFOs. 
Two previous draft agreements at the Conference have been 
criticized by Peter Payoyo for their failure to resurrect and address 
squarely the allocation issue.66 Payoyo posits that allocation issues 
must be addressed first and foremost if the international commu-
nity wishes to truly resolve the fishery crisis. "Who gets how much 
of what, and why" must be resolved.67 Without answers to these 
questions, Payoyo believes, biological conservation attempts by 
concerned parties will not be practically made. Payoyo contends 
that allocation issues can best be resolved by working within the 
theoretical norm of the "common heritage of humankind," which 
advocates that all high seas natural resources "must be developed, 
administered, conserved, and distributed on the basis of interna-
tional cooperation and for the benefit of all mankind."68 
Payoyo believes that such an approach could reduce problems of 
resource allocation. Whereas under the current draft agreement, 
allocation problems are characterized as competing state property 
claims to fish, he suggests that a common heritage of mankind 
framework would re-orient the issues so they become "non-prop-
erty" claims. After such a regulation, IFOs would not be regulators 
(as under the present regime), but instead "trustees" of high seas re-
sources. IFO managers would distribute resources according to a 
common heritage approach involving the sharing of international 
66 Payoyo, supra note 60. 
67 Ibid at4-5. 
68 Ibid. at 9, citing Article III(5) of the "Draft Ocean Space Treaty" (Malta, 
UN Doc. A/AC.138/53 (August 1971)) (paper submitted by Malta to the UN 
Seabed Committee in August 1971). 
30 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
revenues among relevant participants with special emphasis on de-
veloping countries receiving funds for their development. 69 
It is difficult to dispute with Payoyo that the present draft 
agreement does little to address exactly how states or IFOs are to 
determine who gets access to resources. However, the nature of, 
and circumstances which have brought about, the UN Conference 
must be taken into the equation. Once this is done, the Agreement 
can and should be defended. 
The present document is a last-ditch attempt to save the con-
cept of international fishery bodies as managers of straddling 
stocks. Like-minded coastal states united to realize their common 
goals at the Conference. Moreover, several members of the "Core 
Group" (including at present Canada, Chile, Iceland, Argentina, 
New Zealand, Norway and Peru) proposed to adopt unilateral 
measures to control high seas fishing should the Conference not 
achieve an acceptable result.7° 
The Agreement is arguably an action document. It brings sub-
stance to the provisions of the 1982 Convention in order to achieve 
the latter Convention's mandate of establishing IFOs to manage 
straddling stocks. It does this in explicit terms. The Conference 
must define principles as well as strengthen and clarify IFO powers 
in order to provide immediate, effective guidelines. This is its 
mandate, and, as argued above, it seems to have largely satisfied its 
objectives. 
The purpose of the UN Conference makes the application of a 
concept such as the "common heritage of mankind" unsuitable. The 
concept, though potentially beneficial in the long term in achieving 
a more equitable allocation of resources, is neither well understood 
nor accepted by the international community as a framework for 
discussion of living resource allocation.71 
69 Ibid. at 36, 39-40. 
70 Meltzer, supra note 4 at 327. 
7l Payoyo himself admits that benefit-sharing must "somehow re-enter the main 
currents of policy discussion" (supra note 60 at 44). In addition to not being a 
"highly debated idea in the 1990s" the concept is in conflict with the relatively 
recent incorporation of the EEZ concept into international customary law. 
Moreover, the concepts application in Part XI of the 1982 Convention has been 
curtailed in the proposed "Draft Resolution and Draft Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 UN Convention" (15 April 1994). This 
resolution is awaiting 40 signatures before being adopted to operate in conjunction 
with the rest of the 1982 Convention. 
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In summary, although the "common heritage of humankind" 
concept is noble, including it as a framework for the resolution of 
immediate disputes and crises would spell the end of the u N 
Conference and jeopardize the future viability of IFOs. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
The UN Conference meets its objectives. The above analysis reveals 
that the 1982 Convention mandate for the establishment of IFOs 
has been comprehensively advanced in the Agreement. The provi-
sions clarify the requirements for and characteristics of an effective 
IFO management structure. This will aid in the establishment of fu-
ture IFOs. The provisions also strengthen IFO state member powers 
in order to rectify the historical ineffectiveness of IFOs such as 
NAFO. 
IX. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
The current international context in which the UN Conference is 
being held indicates that the Agreement will be affirmed. The 
threats of unilateral action are real. The Canadian government 
unanimously adopted legislation to take enforcement action to pro-
tect straddling stocks outside Canada's EFZ in the NAFO Regulatory 
Area. Moreover, Canada's seriousness in taking such unilateral ac-
tion is revealed by its simultaneous amendment to its acceptance of 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Hague. It has done this 
to preclude any challenge which might undermine Canada's ability 
to protect the stocks by taking the temporary emergency actions it 
has.72 Another member of the "Core Group," Chile, has announced 
its consideration of a Presential Sea, which would extend coastal 
state authority to high seas areas adjacent to the EEZ to permit 
functional management of a vast ocean area in the absence of other 
regulatory authority and while international negotiations are 
underway.73 
72 Government of Canada, Press Release NR-HQ-94-30E, "Canada Takes 
Action to End Foreign Over fishing" (10 May 1994). 
73 See generally F. 0. Vicuna, "Toward an Effective Management of High Seas 
Fisheries and the Settlement of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea" (1993) 24 
0.D.I.L. 81 at 88. For a critical analysis of the Presential sea concept, see Joyner, 
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Not surprisingly, DWFSs and maritime nations such as the 
United States find such unilateral acts to be unorthodox and highly 
disruptive, for they have the potential to devolve the oceans regime 
into what Edward Miles calls a "national lakes approach to ocean 
regime[s] ."74 Since more extensive unilateral acts are the real alter-
native to a treaty agreement, DWFSS are more likely to accept the 
Agreement, including its limitations on the traditional monopoly of 
a flag state's authority over its nationals. This position is evident in a 
recent United States Department of Defense paper advocating that 
the United States become a party to the 1982 Convention.75 The 
Department finds that the Convention as a whole establishes an 
ocean regulatory regime that is in the national security interests of 
the United States.76 Since the Agreement endorses international 
organizational management of high seas resources, provides manda-
tory dispute resolution procedures, and reinforces the dear set of 
maritime zone boundaries established in the 1982 Convention, it is 
arguable that these aspects of the Agreement contribute to a stable 
oceans regime. Consequently, it is in the interests of the United 
States, with its global military and commercial interests, to ratify 
the Agreement and the 1982 Convention. 
It is also foreseeable that the dispute with regard to the nature 
of the Agreement is likely to be resolved. During the present inter-
session at the UN Conference, officials for the United States and the 
EU indicated that they perceive the present negotiations as a means 
to create a binding legal document. 77 If these comments are ac-
cepted by other DWFSs, this will be a considerable "victory" for 
coastal states. It will also increase the chances of the Agreement's 
provisions being implemented. 
Furthermore, states throughout the world are increasingly rec-
ognizing the "global" nature of their actions and the need for more 
concerted international cooperative action. This fact is evident in 
the keen interest taken by states at the UNCED Conference and in 
the numerous FAO and UN Conferences on the implementation of 
supra note 44; T. A. Clingan, Jr. "Mar Presencial (The Presential Sea): Deja vu all 
over again?-A Response to Francisco Orrego Vicuna" (1993) 24 O.D.I.L. 93. 
74 E. L. Miles, "Preparations for UNCLOS rv?" (1988) 19 O.D.I.L. 421 at 426. 
75 United States of America, Department of Defense, "National Security and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" Quly 1994) [unpublished 
paper]. 
76 Ibid at i. 
77 Swan, supra note 56. 
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the various resolutions agreed to at UNCED. IFOs represent a real and 
potentially effective forum in which states can realize the need for 
greater international cooperation. 
Recent conciliatory actions in NAFO reveal further hope. In 1992 
the EU ceased fishing northern cod on the Nose of the Grand Banks 
and has agreed to accept all NAFO conservation decisions. In late 
1993 NAFO imposed further moratoria on stocks on the Tail of the 
Grand Banks so as to be in accord with the moratoria imposed by 
Canada.78 
Most importantly, the Agreement's ratification is in the interest 
of distant-water fishing, maritime and coastal states. Ratification 
will clarify and bolster the legal oceans regime. In contrast, refusal 
to ratify will seriously undermine the 1982 Convention's goal of 
order and conservation of ocean resources. Refusal to ratify will also 
leave Canada and other coastal states with the option of taking fur-
ther unilateral action. Although such acts seem beneficial in the 
sense that they have an immediate impact on foreign fishing activi-
ties, they are only temporary measures: a unilateral act is only ef-
fective if the nation can enforce its claim. Moreover, for nations 
such as Canada, which are highly dependent on international trade, 
unilateral acts could affect other vital interests. Hence, if Canada 
continues to take unilateral action, its international trade with 
Japan, the United States, and the EU could be affected by retalia-
tory measures. 
In contrast, the UN Conference provides an opportunity to bol-
ster the powers of IFOs which can act as a neutral arena for the com-
peting claims and interests of coastal states and DWFSs. The history 
of NAFO reveals that the legal structure in which IFOs gained their 
management and enforcement authority was deficient. The 
Agreement gives the legal opportunity to rectify and clarify the 
roles and powers of presently existing and future IFOS. The 
Agreement also moves towards a reduction in the tension between 
coastal states and DWFSs with its emphasis on the mutual interest 
that both parties share in straddling fish stocks, and the larger 
ecosystem in which the stocks are exploited. 
78 Government of Canada, Press Release B-HQ-94-19, "The Fisheries Crisis in 
the Northwest Atlantic" Qune 1994). 
